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Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification
Abstract
Increasingly, psychologists are giving expert testimony in court on the accu racy of eyewitness identification
(Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Eyewitness experts typically are cognitive or social psychologists
who have published research articles on the topic of eyewitness memory. Expert testi mony in eyewitness
identification is most commonly offered by the defense in criminal cases but is occasionally countered by
opposing expert testimony offered by the prosecution. The increasing use of such expert testimony owes
largely to the growing recognition that mistaken eyewitness identification is the single most common
precursor to the conviction of innocent people (Doyle, 2005). In addition, there is an increasingly strong case
that the exist ing safeguards designed to protect defendants from erroneous conviction resulting from
mistaken identification, such as motions to suppress sugges tive procedures, cross-examination, and right to
counsel at live lineups, are ineffective (Van Wallendael, Devenport, Cutler, & Penrod, 2007).
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CHAPTER 5 
Expert Testimony Regarding 
Eyewitness Identification 
Brian L. Cutler and Gary L. Wells 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 
ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Increasingly, psychologists are giving expert testimony in court on the accu-
racy of eyewitness identification (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). 
Eyewitness experts typically are cognitive or social psychologists who have 
published research articles on the topic of eyewitness memory. Expert testi-
mony in eyewitness identification is most commonly offered by the defense 
in criminal cases but is occasionally countered by opposing expert testimony 
offered by the prosecution. The increasing use of such expert testimony owes 
largely to the growing recognition that mistaken eyewitness identification 
is the single most common precursor to the conviction of innocent people 
(Doyle, 2005). In addition, there is an increasingly strong case that the exist-
ing safeguards designed to protect defendants from erroneous conviction 
resulting from mistaken identification, such as motions to suppress sugges-
tive procedures, cross-examination, and right to counsel at live lineups, are 
ineffective (Van Wallendael, Devenport, Cutler, & Penrod, 2007). 
The decision to admit expert testimony is left to the discretion of the 
trial judge, and the likelihood of admission varies from state to state and 
from one federal district to another. States with favorable case law (e.g., Cal-
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ifornia, Georgia, South Carolina) typically admit expert testimony when 
proffered. States with unfavorable case law (e.g., Florida) rarely admit expert 
testimony. The most commonly cited reason for not admitting expert testi-
mony is that the testimony is merely a matter of common sense (Schmechel, 
O'Toole, Easterly, & Lofus, 2006). 
Expert testimony is controversial in several respects. One set of contro-
versial issues revolves around the science underlying the expert testimony. 
In particular, some question the reliability and external validity of the 
research findings. Reliability in this instance refers to whether the factors 
about which experts testify (e.g., stress, weapon focus, lineup procedures) 
demonstrate reliable effects on identification accuracy. This reliability is 
often determined through the application of statistical procedures within a 
given experiment (e.g., tests of statistical significance that rule out chance 
as an explanation) and through procedures that collapse findings across a 
large set of individual studies (e.g., meta-analyses). External validity, on the 
other hand, refers to the extent to which eyewitness research conducted in 
the laboratory generalizes to actual crimes. A second set of controversies 
pertains to whether expert testimony is needed or helpful to juries. These 
controversies address such issues as whether the testimony tells jurors some-
thing they do not already know and whether the testimony assists them in 
their deliberation. 
RESEARCH RELEVANT TO CONTROVERSIES 
The science underlying expert testimony can be divided into two general 
areas: (1) research on eyewitness identification, which forms the substance of 
the expert testimony, and (2) research addressing the need for expert testi-
mony and the effects of such testimony on jurors. 
Controversy 1: Research on Eyewitness Identification 
Experts draw on a large body of literature on human memory in general and 
eyewitness memory in particular. The research on eyewitness memory has 
largely developed since the 1970s, though there are studies dating back over 
100 years. The research on eyewitness identification uses a common method-
ology. Research participants, often undergraduate students, are exposed to 
an enacted crime or event through live staging, videotape, or another similar 
medium. Following the event, eyewitnesses are asked to attempt to iden-
tify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present lineup or perpetrator-absent 
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lineup. The former lineup represents the situation in which the suspect is 
guilty, and the latter resembles the situation in which an innocent person 
is suspected of having committed the crime. Each study has an objective, 
which is normally to investigate the influence of one or more specific factors 
on identification accuracy. The factor of interest is systematically manipu-
lated, participants are randomly assigned to conditions, and identification 
accuracy rates are compared across conditions. For example, Platz and Hosch 
(1988) investigated the accuracy of same- versus other-race eyewitness iden-
tifications in a field study. Black, Hispanic, and white individuals posing 
as customers visited convenience stores in El Paso, Texas. These customers 
were served by black, Hispanic, and white clerks. The customers engaged in 
memorable interactions with the clerks (e.g., paying for a pack of cigarettes 
with pennies). Following their visits, an investigator asked each clerk to 
identify the three customers from photographic lineups. Using these proce-
dures, Platz and Hosch were able to compare identification accuracy rates for 
same-race identifications (e.g., Hispanic clerks' identifications of Hispanic 
customers) with other-race identifications (e.g., Hispanic clerks' identifica-
tions of white and black customers). Platz and Hosch found that cross-race 
identifications were significantly less likely to be accurate than same-race 
identifications, a finding that has been replicated numerous times in the 
research (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
This common methodology has many positive features. The controlled 
laboratory setting (or a controlled field setting) permits the investigator 
to designate the to-be-recognized perpetrator, so, unlike in actual crimes, 
the accuracy of the witnesses' identifications is known with certainty. The 
controlled setting permits the investigator to collect multiple observations 
under the same conditions-an important feature of research, and one that 
allows for conclusions about the reliability of phenomena. This methodol-
ogy enables the investigator to hold many important factors constant while 
systematically manipulating one or more factors of interest and to randomly 
assign participant-witnesses to these conditions. Systematic manipulation 
and random assignment are important methods of establishing causal rela-
tionships between variables and outcomes. Thus, although it has been criti-
cized as being unrealistic and not representative of actual crimes, the meth-
odology has numerous advantages over investigations of actual crimes. One 
cannot, for example, control and manipulate conditions, conduct multiple or 
repeated observations, and know with certainty whether the identifications 
are correct in studies of actual crimes. The use of college students as partici-
pants has also been cited as a limitation, as college students do not repre-
sent the range of characteristics found in crime victims. On the other hand, 
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college students are better witnesses than are those who are significantly 
younger or older (Neuschatz & Cutler, 2008). Accordingly, college students' 
good visual acuity, general health, memory abilities, and intelligence will, 
if anything, overestimate the performance of eyewitnesses in general. Aside 
from these age-related factors, however, there is no reason to believe that 
the memory processes of college students operate in fundamentally different 
ways than the memory processes of the public at large. 
Research on eyewitness identification can be further divided into two 
groups of factors: system and estimator variables (Wells, 1978). System vari-
ables are under the control of the justice system and can be modified in 
actual cases to influence the accuracy of identifications. Examples of system 
variables are the instructions given to an eyewitness prior to a lineup and 
the manner in which a lineup is presented to an eyewitness. Estimator vari-
ables, by contrast, are not under the control of the justice system and can 
only be used to estimate the accuracy of eyewitness identification. Examples 
of estimator variables include the stress experienced by the eyewitness and 
whether the eyewitness and perpetrator are of the same or difference race. 
The estimator-system variable distinction has been useful as a guiding 
principle in the research literature by focusing research efforts on factors 
over which the criminal justice system does or does not exert control. Table 
5.1 provides a limited summary of the estimator and system variables that 
have been examined in the eyewitness identification research. 
Controversy 2: Expert Testimony 
A second body of research has revolved around the questions of whether 
expert testimony is needed and whether it is helpful to jurors. This research 
often becomes the topic of expert testimony when the admissibility of it is 
challenged. The issues may be debated in briefs to the court, in an admis-
sibility hearing (with or without expert testimony), or both. The most com-
mon reason given by judges for not admitting expert testimony is that the 
testimony is a matter of common sense (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, 
& Bradshaw, 2006; Schmechel et al., 2006). Considerable research has 
addressed this issue using a variety of methodologies, such as surveys of lay 
knowledge of eyewitness memory (e.g., Schmechel et al., 2006), evaluation 
of peoples' abilities to post-diet (i.e., when persons naive to the results of a 
study are asked to "guess" the results) the results of eyewitness identification 
experiments (e.g., Wells, 1984), and examination of mock jurors' decision 
making in cases involving eyewitness identification (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, 
& Dexter, 1990). These studies converge on the conclusion that research 
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on eyewitness identification is often at odds with common sense and sup-
ports the need for expert testimony. For example, jurors, when left to their 
own devices, may not be aware of or do not take into consideration certain 
factors, such as the own-race bias and extreme stress experienced by the 
witness. Jurors tend to assume that eyewitness identifications are the prod-
uct of eyewitness memory, and they undervalue the impact of suggestive 
identification procedures. Furthermore, jurors place more weight on eyewit-
ness confidence-particularly confidence long after an identification is made 
(e.g., confidence expressed during a trial)-than is warranted. Indeed, the 
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fact that well-accepted lineup procedures that have been used for decades 
throughout the United States have been found to be inferior to relatively 
simple modifications devised in the psychological laboratory is itself a form 
of evidence that eyewitness identification is not merely a matter of common 
sense (Wells & Hasel, 2008). 
Another reason expert testimony is sometimes not admitted is that the 
judge concludes that the expert opinions are not commonly accepted among 
research experts. Two published surveys (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989; 
Kassin et al., 2001) of eyewitness experts have empirically addressed this 
conclusion. Consensus is evident in these studies, particularly in the more 
recent survey. For example, the Kassin and colleagues (2001) survey revealed 
that more than 80% of experts surveyed believed that research findings 
concerning unconscious transference, exposure time, simultaneous (present-
ing photos as a set) versus sequential presentation (presenting photos one at 
a time), the forgetting curve, accuracy-confidence correlation, and weapon 
focus were reliable enough to warrant expert testimony. Ninety percent or 
more of experts surveyed believed that research findings concerning the 
own-race bias, hypnotic susceptibility, alcohol intoxication, child suggest-
ibility, postevent information, mug-shot-induced bias, confidence malleabil-
ity, lineup instructions, and wording of questions were reliable enough for 
expert testimony. Comparatively lower percentages agreed about the reli-
ability of other phenomena, for example, stress experienced by the eyewit-
ness (60%), the influence of training for eyewitness testimony (39%), and 
event violence (37%). Consensus alone is a questionable criterion for admis-
sibility because it is possible for consensus to exist in the absence of sound 
research. When this happens, invalid techniques or findings may be admit-
ted in court. Likewise valid techniques and findings that are relatively new 
(and for which consensus has not yet developed) may be ruled inadmissible. 
The federal courts and many state courts now use consensus as one fac-
tor but now consider other factors as well (consistent with U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions in the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Im: [1993} 
and Kumho Tire Ltd. v, Carmichael [19991 cases). 
Another body of research has examined the impact of expert testimony 
on mock jurors' decisions, empirically addressing the concern that expert 
testimony will overwhelm the jury. These studies have revealed mixed find-
ings. Most early research shows that expert testimony makes mock jurors 
more skeptical about eyewitness identification (Leippe, 1995). Some studies 
find that expert testimony improves juror sensitivity to eyewitness factors. 
In these studies, jurors exposed to expert testimony rely more on factors 
known from the research to influence eyewitness identification and less on 
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factors that are known to not strongly predict identification accuracy, as 
compared to jurors not exposed to expert testimony (Cutler, Penrod, & Dex-
ter 1989). More recent research, however, also shows that expert testimony 
may have no effect (Devenport & Cutler, 2004), or its effect may be complex 
and qualified by other factors in the trial (Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Seib, 
2004). Hence, research on the effects of testimony by eyewitness experts 
has not definitively established its positive effects on jury decision making. 
On the other hand, other areas of expert testimony are routinely accepted 
without such evidence, and the eyewitness area is somewhat unique in its 
attempts to test the benefits hypothesis. Furthermore, serious questions can 
be raised about how well juries are doing without the benefit of eyewitness 
experts in light of the fact that mistaken identification accounts for over 
75% of the jury convictions that were later proven wrong based on forensic 
DNA testing (Innocence Project, 2007). In some ways, it is arbitrary to label 
expert testimony as the "event" and its absence as the "nonevent" because 
there can be untoward consequences of the default decision to not provide 
jurors with expert testimony information. 
GAPS IN THE PRESENT SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
Controversy 1: Research on Eyewitness Identification 
The gaps in the research on eyewitness identification prevent the expert 
from providing the court with the information that it most needs. The issue 
before the court is whether a given eyewitness identification is correct or 
incorrect. Information that would be highly diagnostic of a specific eyewit-
ness's accuracy would include base-rate information on the accuracy of eye-
witnesses, knowledge about individual differences in identification accuracy 
(with particular reference about the witness's personal characteristics), and 
how the specific conditions under which the perpetrator was viewed and 
identified influenced identification accuracy. 
Base-rate information is critical to prediction. In the case of eyewitness 
identification, a critical base rate for purposes of prediction is the probabil-
ity that a given lineup actually contains the perpetrator. Because a proper 
lineup contains only one suspect (the remainder being "fillers" who are 
known to not be the perpetrator), mistaken identifications of a suspect occur 
only when the actual perpetrator is not in the lineup (otherwise the identi-
fication of the suspect would be accurate). In experiments, the base rate for 
the suspect being the perpetrator is commonly set at 50%. As this base rate 
increases, the probability that an identified suspect is the perpetrator also 
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increases (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). This change in the probability of error 
as a function of the base rate is independent of the accuracy of the eyewit-
nesses' memories. This happens for precisely the same reasons that a medical 
test (e.g., prostate test) produces many more false positives in one popula-
tion (e.g., men under 40) than another population (men over 50) despite the 
test being equally sensitive: The base rates for the disease are higher in one 
population than the other. Because we do not know the real-world base 
rate for perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups, the science is 
severely limited in predicting rates of mistaken identification of suspects in 
the real world. It has been noted, however, that the real-world base rate is 
not a single figure, but instead is something that varies from one jurisdic-
tion to another as a function of the criteria that a given police department 
uses to decide whether to place a suspect in a lineup (Wells, 2006; Wells & 
Olson, 2002). 
Furthermore, eyewitness researchers sometimes deliberately calibrate 
their studies to produce accuracy rates around 50% because this maximum 
variability in accuracy allows them to detect influence of the variables of 
interest. Thus, it would be a gross exaggeration to conclude that labora-
tory research demonstrates that eyewitnesses are about 50% accurate. Eyewit-
ness researchers can demonstrate any level of accuracy by manipulating the 
conditions under which the crime occurred or the identification is made, 
including mistaken identification rates of nearly 100% (cf. Wells & Brad-
field, 1998). The base rate of correct or mistaken identification in actual 
cases is unknown. 
Although it is not possible to know the base rate for the identification 
of innocent suspects in actual cases, there is a very interesting type of sta-
tistic that has been collected from samples of actual police lineups that has 
some bearing on the issue. Specifically, when a lineup is conducted properly, 
it is composed of one suspect (who might or might not be the perpetrator) 
and the remaining lineup members are merely fillers. Fillers are not sus-
pects, and if they are identified by an eyewitness it is immediately clear that 
the eyewitness has made a mistake. Hence, it can be instructive to find out 
how often eyewitnesses identify fillers in actual cases. Several studies of this 
type have now been published that report the rate of filler identifications 
made by actual eyewitnesses to crimes. Behrman and Davey (2001) found 
a filler identification rate of 24%; Behrman and Richards (2005) reported a 
rate of 15%; Slater (1994) reported a rate of 22%; Valentine, Pickering, and 
Darling (2003) reported a rate of 22%; Wright and McDaid (1996) reported 
a rate of 20%; and Wright and Skagerberg (2007) reported a rate of 21%. 
Averaging across these studies yields an estimated filler identification rate 
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of around 21%. In other words, 21% of eyewitnesses to actual crimes picked 
fillers when shown a lineup. Although we do not know how many of those 
who picked a suspect were also mistaken, the filler identification rate clearly 
shows that the chances for an innocent suspect being mistakenly identified 
are not trivial. In fact, an innocent suspect often stands a higher risk of mis-
taken identification than does a typical filler because of a variety of biases 
in the structure of the lineup and cues that the lineup administrator might 
inadvertently leak to the eyewitness regarding which person is the suspect 
and which are fillers. For example, if the fillers were chosen based on their 
resemblance to the suspect, the innocent suspect will inevitably look more 
like the perpetrator than will the fillers. As another example, if an investi-
gator influences the eyewitness advertently or inadvertently, the influence is 
more likely to encourage the eyewitness to select the suspect than a filler. 
The accuracy of eyewitness identification is also dependent upon individ-
ual differences. Put simply, some people are better than others at identifying 
strangers. Some research has attempted to identify individual characteristics 
that are associated with identification accuracy, such as self-reported face 
recognition skill, training in eyewitness identification, demographic char-
acteristics, personality factors, and intelligence. Cutler and Penrod (1995) 
reviewed this literature and found few witness characteristics that reliably 
predicted identification accuracy. There are some notable exceptions. Young 
children (e.g., preschoolers) are more susceptible to mistaken identification 
than are older children and adults (e.g., Parker & Ryan, 1993), and own-race 
identifications are more likely to be accurate than other-race identifications 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Thus, the research literature does not permit 
us to diagnose identification accuracy from personal characteristics with a 
high degree of accuracy. 
As mentioned above, there is a wealth of research examining how the 
conditions surrounding the crime and the identification influence identi-
fication accuracy. Most of this research examines main effects of specific 
factors or at most two-way interactions between factors. By main effects we 
mean the effect of a given factor on identification accuracy while holding 
all other factors constant or averaging across their effects. The summary 
statements in Table 5.1 describe main effects of specific factors. Witnessing 
conditions and identification procedures, by contrast, involve combinations 
of factors, not main effects. Although some research has examined interac-
tions between factors, we have relatively little knowledge about how these 
factors work in combination. For example, we know that other-race identifi-
cations are more likely to be incorrect than own-race identifications. We also 
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know that the difference between own-race and other-race identifications is 
exacerbated by brief as compared to longer exposure time to the perpetrator 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). We do not know, however, the extent to which 
the magnitude of the own-race bias is further qualified by such factors as 
the amount of stress experienced by the witness, the suggestiveness of the 
lineup instructions, and the degree of resemblance between the suspect and 
the other persons in the lineup. Our lack of knowledge about interactions 
among and between witnessing conditions and lineup procedures limits our 
ability to assess identification accuracy given a specific set of conditions. 
Another factor that would have to be considered in estimating the 
chances that a given eyewitness is accurate or not in a given case is the 
"pleading effect," recently described by Charman and Wells (2006) and by 
Wells, Memon, and Penrod (2006). The pleading effect refers to the fact 
that approximately 80% of those charged with a serious crime plead guilty 
and, hence, do not go to trial. Assume that those pleading guilty are almost 
all guilty, whereas those who are not guilty instead take their case to trial. 
This means that if only 4% of the suspects identified are innocent (and 
hence all go to trial), whereas a mere 20% of the 96% who are guilty go to 
trial (the remaining pleading guilty), then at trial level the rate of mistaken 
identification is over 17%. Using this same logic, if 10% of the identified 
suspects are innocent and all go to trial, whereas a mere 20% of the 90% 
who are guilty go to trial, then the rate of mistaken identification at the trial 
level leaps to more than 35%. 
In summary, the gaps in the research literature on eyewitness identi-
fication include lack of knowledge about (1) the base rates of accurate and 
mistaken eyewitness identification, (2) individual difference factors affect-
ing eyewitness identification, (3) interactions between variables, and (4) the 
unique characteristics of cases that actually proceed to trial. We turn now 
to gaps in the research on expert testimony. 
Controversy 2: Expert Testimony 
In some respects, it is ironic that gaps in the research on expert testimony 
are used as a basis for denying admissibility. The irony stems from the 
fact that no other scholarly discipline in which experts testify (i.e., out-
side of psychology) has empirically addressed the admissibility arguments 
and their impact on juries. Specifically, psychologists, as noted above, have 
conducted scientific research on such questions as whether the knowledge 
gleaned from the research exceeds common sense, whether scholars with 
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relevant expertise agree on the reliability of research conclusions, and the 
extent to which expert testimony assists or prejudices the jury. Neverthe-
less, having trained our microscopes on these empirical issues, the scientific 
methods underlying these studies are fair game for scrutiny. Shortcomings 
associated with the research have been identified, and the quality of the 
research has been a basis for cross-examination and argument in admis-
sibility hearings. 
Consider the argument that expert testimony should be admitted 
because lay jurors need to be educated about the factors that influence iden-
tification accuracy. The research supporting this assertion relies on general 
knowledge tests of the public, studies in which participants are asked to 
estimate the outcomes of scientific experiments on eyewitness identification, 
and studies of mock juror decisions. Surveys of lay knowledge have been 
criticized because the act of completing a survey does not resemble the task 
facing an actual juror. The knowledge tests themselves (i.e., the wording 
of the questions and the scoring of the answers) have been the subject of 
critique. Mock juror studies have been criticized because the studies often 
rely on college students rather than the kinds of people who serve on juries. 
Furthermore, mock trials by necessity rely on abbreviated trial materials, 
including written narratives, and have therefore been criticized for not being 
realistic. The decisions of mock jurors have no real consequences for the 
defendant. In short, both the surveys of general knowledge and the trial 
simulation research lack the trappings of an actual court case, and some 
are unwilling to conclude that the research can be generalized to actual 
trials. The gap in the literature is research showing that actual jurors judg-
ing actual cases lack the requisite knowledge for evaluating the accuracy of 
eyewitness identification. 
In a similar fashion, there are gaps in the research on general accep-
tance. Indeed, there are only two surveys of experts, both conducted by the 
same lead investigator (Kassin et al., 1989, 2001). When these studies are 
reviewed by an expert witness during an admissibility hearing, the meth-
ods and conclusions of the research are scrutinized. Cross-examination has 
focused on such issues as how "experts" are defined in the survey studies. 
The surveys included only eyewitness experts, but should it have included 
other cognitive psychologists with expertise on human memory? The sam-
ple size (64 in the 2001 study) is small, and therefore the margin of error 
is substantial. To what extent are the experts' opinions influenced by their 
vested interest in the admissibility of expert testimony? Were experts whose 
opinions are known to differ from the consensus included in the survey? 
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MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 
Several myths and misconceptions about expert testimony are associated 
with the above-noted gaps in the scientific knowledge and are harbored 
by the various players within the justice system. First, many defense attor-
neys would like to believe that citizens make poor eyewitnesses and that 
eyewitness identifications are usually incorrect. There is no scientific basis 
for this belief The research clearly demonstrates that mistaken eyewitness 
identifications occur and that the likelihood of mistaken identification is 
systematically influenced by certain factors associated with the crime and 
identification (see Table 5.1), but the research provides no firm base rate 
of mistaken identifications. Earlier we noted that laboratory studies yield 
about a 50% accuracy rate, but this figure should not be mistaken for the 
base rate in actual cases because laboratory conditions are often designed to 
achieve about a 50% accuracy rate. Prosecuting attorneys occasionally attack 
expert testimony based on misconceptions, and judges' often deny proffers 
of expert testimony based on these same misconceptions. These misconcep-
tions include the beliefs that eyewitness research is not generally accepted 
within the scientific community, the research findings are a matter of com-
mon sense, and the research does not apply to actual crimes. Citizens, who 
serve as jurors, are known to have misconceptions about how certain factors 
influence identification accuracy. These misconceptions are revealed in sur-
veys of lay knowledge about eyewitness memory and include such mistaken 
beliefs as extreme stress improves identification accuracy, and eyewitness 
confidence is strongly related to identification accuracy (Schmechel et al., 
2006). 
THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 
In discussing the scientifically supported and unsupported use of expert 
testimony, it is helpful to review the distinction between "social fact" and 
"social framework" expert testimony as articulated by Monahan and Walker 
(2002). Social fact testimony refers to testimony about the specific fact in 
question (e.g., whether the eyewitness identification is accurate). Social frame-
work testimony may be offered when an issue in question is an instance of 
a scientific finding or theory (e.g., research on the relation between stress 
experienced by the eyewitness and identification accuracy may be relevant 
to the ultimate issue of whether the identification is correct). In short, social 
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framework testimony is a scientifically supported use, whereas social fact 
testimony is a scientifically unsupported use. 
Scientifically Supported Uses 
Expert testimony has several scientifically supported uses. The main scien-
tifically supported use is to educate jurors and judges about basic processes 
in human memory and about the factors that are known from the research 
to predict (and the factors that are known not to predict) the accuracy of eye-
witness identifications (i.e., social framework expert testimony). For example, 
a review of the police reports might reveal the potential for extreme stress 
and weapon focus to have influenced the accuracy of the identification in 
the case. If so, it would be reasonable to testify about the research findings 
concerning the effects of extreme stress and weapon focus. 
Another scientifically supported use is to evaluate the quality of iden-
tification tests, such as show-ups and lineups. An evaluation can take sev-
eral forms. A review of the file might reveal that a lineup was given with 
or without a set of written instructions and that the lineup was not blind 
(i.e., the investigator who conducted the test knew which photo was of the 
suspect). One scientifically supported use, therefore, is to testify about the 
research addressing the effects of instructions and blind administration 
procedures on identification accuracy. A second method of evaluating iden-
tification procedures involves comparing the procedures used in the case 
with those embodied in scientifically determined best practices (Wells et 
al., 1998). The procedures used can also be compared against practices rec-
ommended by the Department of Justice, American Bar Association, and 
state- or department-level guidelines. A third method involves empirical 
assessments of lineups. An empirical assessment may be conducted when 
there is a concern that the photo of the suspect stands out in such a way 
that it is obvious which photo in the array is that of the suspect. The photo 
could stand out because of its similarity to the perpetrator relative to the 
other photos or because of nature of the photograph itself (e.g., unique back-
ground for the photo). There exists a technology for assessing the fairness of 
lineup composition and metrics for summarizing lineup fairness (Malpass 
& Lindsay, 1999; Tredoux, 1998; Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1979). Gener-
ally, this technology involves providing individuals (non-eyewitnesses) with 
the eyewitness's description of the perpetrator and asking them to attempt 
to identify the suspect from the lineup. If the suspect's photo stands out 
because it is the only one that matches the description of the perpetrator, the 
"mock witnesses" will be able to identify the perpetrator. This is a sign of a 
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biased lineup. If the suspect's photo does not stand out, the mock witnesses 
should identify the suspect photo only at chance levels. 
Scientifically Unsupported Uses 
The main value of expert testimony is to educate the jury about eyewitness 
memory and the research findings. The state of the science, as summarized 
above, does not permit an assessment of the accuracy of an individual eye-
witness. Accordingly, an opinion that a witness in a specific set of circum-
stances is unlikely to be accurate (i.e., social fact expert testimony) is not a 
scientifically supported use of expert testimony. At first glance it may seem 
as if we have made a straw man argument, for, by law, determination of the 
accuracy of a witness is the responsibility of the jury, and the judge should 
not even allow such an expert opinion. Based on this fact, the expert should 
never be put in the position to give an opinion about the accuracy of an 
individual eyewitness even if he or she desired to do so. In practice, how-
ever, judges vary considerably in their interpretations of what is and what 
is not allowable. For example, in one case in which the first author testified, 
the judge expressed surprise and disappointment that the expert was not 
prepared to give an opinion about the accuracy of the witness. Some judges 
may allow such an opinion even though it seems at variance with the law. If 
the judge does not allow it, a clever attorney may find a way to broach the 
subject, such as with the use of a hypothetical question (e.g., "If a person was 
robbed by a perpetrator of another race under extremely high stress condi-
tions and was shown a suggestive lineup, is it likely that the victim would 
make a mistaken identification?"). The judge may permit such a question, 
thus allowing the expert to given an opinion that may be generalized to the 
specific witness in the trial. Put bluntly, any statement that allows the jury 
to infer that the expert believes a specific witness to be inaccurate, whether 
in response to a direct or hypothetical question, is a scientifically unsup-
ported use of expert testimony. A related scientifically unsupported use of 
expert testimony is to convey the opinion (directly or indirectly) that an 
identification procedure is incapable of producing a correct identification. 
Suggestive identification procedures or procedures that do not meet best 
practice standards are quite capable of producing correct identifications. 
Another category of scientifically unsupported testimony would be tes-
timony that is at odds with the scientific research. As in any field, expert 
testimony should be limited to conclusions that are based on sound science. 
General acceptance of the research conclusions is usually a good indictor 
of the soundness of the underlying science. For a summary of generally 
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accepted findings in the research on eyewitness memory, see Kassin and 
colleagues (2001). 
Scientifically Controversial or Untested Issues 
Although the research literature on eyewitness identification is substantial 
and mature, it is not exhaustive, and it has not examined the effects of all 
of the factors and combinations of factors that are found in actual crimes. 
Accordingly, experts may occasionally find themselves in the position to tes-
tify about factors that have not been subjected to scientific research or have 
been studied but with mixed findings. Some, for example, maintain that 
the research base is not adequate to support testimony that simultaneous 
presentation yields a greater rate of mistaken identifications than sequen-
tial presentation because the potential qualifying conditions have not been 
sufficiently examined in research (McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, & Tredoux, 
2006). When faced with such situations, the expert might take a conserva-
tive approach and offer no testimony about an unstudied phenomenon, or 
the expert might extrapolate from related research. In the latter case, the 
expert should, of course, explain the basis for and limits of his or her testi-
mony. 
We have discussed scientifically supported uses of expert testimony 
(explanations of how factors influence accuracy in the research and assess-
ments of identification tests), scientifically unsupported uses of expert testi-
mony (opinions about the accuracy of individual eyewitnesses), and scientifi-
cally untested issues (explanations of factors that have not been studied in 
research or that have mixed findings). Most expert testimony content can be 
classified into these three categories, and there is little else with respect to 
the content of testimony that might be labeled controversial. The controver-
sial aspect of this type of expert testimony is whether it should be allowed 
in the first place, as discussed above. 
COMMUNICATING CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSIES 
IN EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 
Circumstances in Which Expert Testimony Is Helpful 
Having articulated the state of the science underlying expert testimony, we 
now turn to the manner in which expert testimony is presented. Before pro-
viding advice concerning the content of testimony and reports, however, we 
must consider the more general issue of the conditions under which expert 
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testimony is more or less useful to the jury. This discussion requires that 
we distinguish between what Wells and Loftus (2003) refer to as "general 
impairment" and "suspect-bias" factors. General impairment factors roughly 
correspond to estimator variables; they are the factors that would lead to 
a general impairment of the eyewitness's ability to encode a perpetrator's 
characteristics-for example, exposure time, stress experienced by the eye-
witness, and cross-race recognition. 
Suspect-bias factors are a subset of system variables pertaining to struc-
tural features of a photo array or lineup procedure that individuate the sus-
pect among the fillers and increase the likelihood that the suspect will be 
identified regardless of whether he is the perpetrator. Suspect-bias factors 
can best be understood in the broader context of the lineup as a forensic 
test of the hypothesis that the suspect is the perpetrator (see Wells & Luus, 
1990, for a similar and more thorough theoretical analysis of lineups). A 
valid test is one that maximizes the likelihood that the identification is a 
product of the eyewitness's memory and minimizes the likelihood that the 
identification is due to other factors. What are those "other" factors that 
could explain a positive identification of an innocent suspect? We identify 
five such suspect-bias factors: (1) the suspect has a close physical resemblance 
to the perpetrator; (2) the eyewitness identified the suspect by guessing; (3) 
some visual characteristic of the lineup makes the suspect stand out relative 
to the fillers (e.g., if the suspect is the only one who matches the description 
of the perpetrator); (4) the suspect is not the perpetrator but is otherwise 
familiar to the eyewitness (e.g., from having seen the suspect or his or her 
photo in a prior identification test), and the eyewitness confuses the source 
of this familiarity; and (5) the eyewitness is influenced by the lineup admin-
istrator to select the suspect. Good lineup tests are those that minimize 
the likelihood that an eyewitness's identification can be explained by one or 
more of these five suspect-bias factors. 
Expert testimony is most helpful when suspect-bias factors are in play. 
As noted in Table 5.1, experts have a good deal to say about how such factors 
as lineup instructions, composition, presentation, and investigator bias can 
increase the likelihood that suspect identifications are due to reasons other 
than the eyewitness's memory of the perpetrator. In these cases, it is helpful 
to have the expert address both general impairment and suspect-bias factors. 
General impairment factors speak to the strength of the eyewitness's mem-
ory of the perpetrator, and suspect-bias factors help explain why an eyewit-
ness with a weak memory of the perpetrator might nevertheless identify a 
suspect and come to believe strongly in the identification. For example, an 
eyewitness who had minimal opportunity to encode the perpetrator's face 
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due to short exposure time and high stress might identify the suspect from a 
lineup because the investigator inadvertently conveyed the suspect's identity 
to the eyewitness during the lineup procedure. 
When suspect-bias factors are not in play, however, expert testimony is 
of limited usefulness, even in the presence of general impairment variables. 
Consider, for example, a case in which an eyewitness who had only a short 
time to encode a perpetrator's characteristics identifies the suspect from a 
lineup conducted by an investigator who is blind to the suspect's identity 
and uses unbiased lineup instructions and photos of fillers that match the 
eyewitness's description of the perpetrator presented sequentially to the eye-
witness (i.e., a procedure reflecting modern "best practices"). In this case, the 
expert's explanation of the importance of general impairment factors is not 
very helpful because it begs the question of why the eyewitness identified 
the suspect and not one of the fillers. The use of a good lineup procedure 
minimizes the likelihood that suspect-bias factors explain the eyewitness 
identification and maximizes the likelihood that the eyewitness identifica-
tion is explained by the eyewitness's memory of the perpetrator. In this 
circumstance, therefore, the jury is not helped very much by testimony con-
cerning general impairment factors. In the absence of suspect-bias factors 
that might explain away a positive identification, the jury would reasonably 
conclude that the eyewitness's memory, no matter how impaired, was suffi-
cient to produce a positive suspect identification from memory. In sum, expert 
testimony is most helpful in cases in which suspect--bias variables might 
explain the eyewitness identification and least helpful in cases in which sus-
pect-bias variables are not relevant. 
To this point we have focused on cases involving lineup identifications. 
Some cases, however, involve show-up identifications. Show-ups involve the 
presentation of a single suspect (or single photo) to the eyewitness. Whereas 
show-up procedures can vary with respect to the degree to which they are 
contaminated by suspect-bias factors (e.g., instructions to the eyewitness, 
influence by the show-up administrator), suspect-bias factors are always 
present and can explain positive identifications. Because there is only one 
suspect, the suspect's identity obviously stands out to both the eyewitness 
and the investigator before any "test" is conducted. In cases that are based on 
show-ups, therefore, testimony about general impairment factors is helpful. 
An eyewitness who has a weak memory of the perpetrator can identify the 
suspect from a show-up by guessing, deduction, or investigator influence, 
and it is impossible to rule out these explanations even when show-ups are 
conducted according to best practices. 
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Content of Reports and Testimony 
The requirements and recommended practices for reports and courtroom 
testimony differ substantially. Written reports usually serve one of two 
purposes. One purpose is to proffer the expert testimony. The report nor-
mally (1) summarizes the proposed content of testimony and the empiri-
cally demonstrated need for the proposed expert testimony and (2) describes 
the witnessing and lineup factors that will comprise the testimony (with 
scholarly references). The report also summarizes the research showing that 
the factors in the proposed testimony are based on sound science, generally 
accepted in the scientific community, and not merely a matter of common 
sense. In anticipation of concerns by the ruling judge, the report should also 
clearly indicate that the expert will not offer an opinion about the accuracy 
of the eyewitness. 
A second purpose of a report is to satisfy discovery requirements. In 
some jurisdictions, the opposing counsel is entitled to a written report sum-
marizing the content of the proffered testimony. The reporting requirements 
vary by jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, a brief memo summarizing the 
factors to be discussed is sufficient; in others, a signed affidavit with more 
elaborate summary and references may be required. The opposing counsel is 
entitled to depose the expert in advance of the trial in some jurisdictions. 
From the perspective of the court, expert testimony about eyewitness 
memory is a unique form of psychological expert testimony. Often when psy-
chologists testify as experts, the testimony is based on psychological assess-
ment of a specific individual, such as a defendant's competence. The eyewit-
ness expert, however, conducts no assessment of the individual eyewitness, 
offers no opinion about the individual eyewitness, and instead testifies about 
general research conclusions (though the expert might offer an opinion 
about the quality of identification procedures used in the case). Because 
expert testimony concerns research conclusions, it behooves the expert to 
take special care in formulating testimony content that will be understood 
by laypeople. The discourse should be geared toward the level of a college 
freshman enrolled in and Introductory Psychology course. Scientific con-
cepts that experts use routinely, such as independent variable, manipulated 
factor, confound, and statistical significance, are terms that may be lost on 
the jury. The use of concrete examples to illustrate such concepts as manipu-
lated factors and confounding variables is advisable. 
A common dilemma for the expert is the level of detail to provide 
about the research. On one extreme, the expert might offer the conclusions 
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about the research (e.g., eyewitnesses make more mistakes when attempting 
to identify perpetrators of another race than perpetrators of their own race) 
without much detail about the research. At the other extreme, the expert 
might offer much more detail, including sample studies, mean differences 
between conditions, and effect-size estimates. There are benefits and costs of 
each approach. The less detailed approach has the advantage of simplicity 
and efficiency but may leave the jurors wanting more information. The more 
detailed approach provides the additional information but adds complexity 
that may be misunderstood and therefore has a greater potential to mislead 
the jury. For example, a jury might conclude that the magnitude of mean 
differences between two conditions observed in a laboratory would general-
ize to the specific situation in the trial, but this is not an appropriate conclu-
sion. The content of the testimony is also dependent upon the preferences of 
the attorney who is conducting the direct examination, and some attorneys 
ask for more detail, others ask for less. 
In our experience, the attorneys who hire eyewitness experts often do 
not have previous experience with this form of expert testimony and yet 
sometimes approach the task with preconceived notions of the content of 
the testimony. The expert, therefore, must educate the attorney about the 
scientifically supported and unsupported aspects of expert testimony and 
work with him or her to develop questions for direct examination that allow 
the expert to convey the science accurately and in a manner that can be 
understood by the jury. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have divided the territory concerning expert testimony into two sub-
topics: controversies about the research and controversies about expert tes-
timony. With respect to the former, there is a large body of research on 
human memory and social influence for experts to draw on to assist the jury 
in evaluating eyewitness identification (see Table 5.1). Gaps in the literature 
exist. These gaps include not knowing the base rates of mistaken identifica-
tion, individual differences, interactions between variables, and characteris-
tics of cases that go to trial. 
A large body of research now addresses expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification itself Some of this research speaks directly to legal standards 
of admissibility. The Frye test (Frye v. United States, 1923), for instance, is 
concerned with whether the opinion is based on knowledge or techniques 
that are generally accepted in the expert's field. The survey literature that 
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we described (e.g., Kassin et al., 2001) suggests that eyewitness identifica-
tion research passes the Frye test on most variables. But general acceptance is 
only one factor in legal admissibility of expert testimony. The more predom-
inant admissibility test today, the Daubert (1993) ruling, inquires whether 
the expert testimony is based on methods and principles that are likely to 
produce valid opinions. The experimental methods that are used in eyewit-
ness research tend to guarantee internal validity, so the issue is largely one 
of external validity. We have explained how eyewitness experts can restrict 
their conclusions (e.g., not claiming that absolute rates of misidentification 
in experiments are directly applicable to a specific case) and focus instead 
on descriptions of relations among variables (e.g., cross-race identifications 
are less reliable than are within-race identifications). A third broad legal 
consideration for admissibility of expert testimony is relevancy. We have 
reviewed data indicating that the kind of information eyewitness experts 
convey appear not to be mere common sense and that expert testimony 
appears to affect how mock jurors reason about the evidence, suggesting 
that such expert testimony is relevant to the jury. 
We have reviewed scientifically supported and unsupported uses of 
expert testimony. Scientifically supported uses of expert testimony include 
educating judges and juries about eyewitness memory and the factors known 
to influence eyewitness memory, such as those summarized in Table 5.1. Sci-
entifically unsupported uses include offering an opinion about the accuracy 
of a specific eyewitness. We explained that when suspect-bias factors are 
not in play, the helpfulness of expert testimony about general impairment 
factors is limited, and we offered suggestions for how to effectively convey 
expert knowledge in expert reports and testimony. 
We have identified some important factors for eyewitness researchers to 
consider if they proffer expert testimony, and we have identified some limits 
to what we think experts can and cannot claim based on the research. At the 
same time, we have refrained from taking a position as to whether courts are 
always wrong when they deny admission of expert testimony or are always 
right when they admit expert testimony. In general, we caution young eye-
witness researchers to not be overly eager to proffer expert testimony. The 
justice system's adversarial structure is a poor fit with the scientist's nor-
mal experiences in dealing with other scientists. Some defense attorneys, for 
instance, are not forthright with information contrary to their client's case. 
Regardless of which side retains the expert's services, there is pressure to go 
further than the science itself justifies. And, money from expert fees has the 
potential to lure the expert to satisfy the retaining attorneys or to win the 
case instead of educating the jury. 
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